An Income Contingent Loan for Extending Paid Parental Leave

*Bruce Chapman and Tim Higgins*, The Australian National University

**Abstract**

*On Mother’s Day, May 10, 2009, the federal government announced an 18 week paid maternity leave scheme to be funded by taxpayers would be introduced in January 2011. This followed a one year review process beginning with the Productivity Commission (PC) being asked to enquire into the social and economic policy issue of paid parental leave (PPL). A case for government subsidy of PPL can be made on the basis that the social benefits exceed the advantages accruing directly to families. In this paper it is argued that there is scope to extend the 18 week grants based leave policy with significant contributions coming from the households assisted, which is an implicit recognition that there are important private benefits from accessing relatively long periods of parental leave. It is explained that commercial banks will not provide funds in the presence of loan repayment uncertainty, a situation quite similar to the market failure inherent with respect to the financing of tuition for higher education. However, an income contingent loan (ICL), similar to HECS, could be used as an optional supplement to the recently announced taxpayer funded scheme, and this idea has cautious but clear support in the PC’s final report. Moral hazard and adverse selection are critical policy issues and these are addressed in the scheme design by: restricting loan duration and size; restricting eligibility to parents with workforce attachment; reducing minimum repayment thresholds to below those of HECS; imposing a loan surcharge, and; making the debt an obligation of both parents. We present simulations of debt, repayment and subsidies for different households. The results show that an optional top-up ICL would not require contributions from taxpayers, yet would introduce flexibility and choice, and provide consumption-smoothing and fair lifetime income distribution outcomes.*

Address for correspondence: Tim Higgins, School of Finance and Applied Statistics, College of Business and Economics, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia. Email: tim.higgins@anu.edu.au

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1. Introduction

Over the last several years there has been enthusiastic debate in Australia concerning the merits or otherwise of different government policy approaches to paid parental leave (PPL). The importance of PPL as a social and economic issue has not been lost on the current government, which announced in May 2008 the introduction of an 18 week taxpayer funded maternity leave scheme, following the 2008/09 Productivity Commission (PC) enquiry into the issue.

The case for PPL can be positioned in a fairly conventional economic theory framework, and this is summarised in section 2. The arguments imply two important things about PPL policy: one, that there seems to be a case for some government subsidy; and two, that there is an apparent failure in the provision of finance from the commercial banking sector to facilitate PPL, thus arguably providing a justification for government intervention beyond subsidies. This motivates for consideration an income contingent loan scheme (ICL) to allow an extension of leave beyond the government’s 18 week grant based policy.

A submission to the PC’s enquiry with a paper commissioned by the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) from Chapman, Higgins and Lin (2008) described the ICL scheme advocated in this paper. After expressing some concerns with the proposal in its draft report, the following appears in the PC’s final report: ‘… in light of the persuasive supplementary input from the proponents of the income contingent loan scheme, the Commission has reconsidered its draft report conclusion (subject to the modifications below) regarding the place for such loans as an optional top-up to a taxpayer-funded base scheme. Accordingly, should the Government consider extending scheme duration and/or the payment rate at some point in the future, the Commission now believes that income contingent loans could provide an appropriate low cost option (given the efficiency costs associated with taxpayer funding) for doing so’.

We concur and believe there are strong economic and financial arguments for its consideration in a form we explore below.

In section 3 we outline the proposed scheme, placing emphasis on identification and mitigation of moral hazard and adverse selection. We introduce scenarios to illustrate how the scheme might work in practice and present results of empirical simulations in section 4. While much of the basic content of this paper follows the CEDA report (Chapman, Higgins and Lin, 2008), the data used in the empirical exercises herein, and the results of those exercises, differ. In addition, the content has been expanded to include: subsidy measures under different discount rate assumptions; an exploration of interactions of the PPL extension scheme with the existing government benefit payment system; and, some basic aggregate costings.

An ICL, we argue, has a role to play in financially assisting families when recent mothers temporarily leave paid employment for child-rearing purposes for extensions of leave beyond the 18 week period. In effect, loans of this type allow parents to tax themselves in the future when their incomes are relatively high, and transfer these financial resources to themselves when household incomes are disrupted from parental leave.

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1 Productivity Commission (2009) (p. 8.18). The modifications the PC referred to include applying a mortgage interest rate to the loan rather than using a surcharge, and piloting the scheme prior to introduction (PC, 2009, p. 8.20)
The main contribution of the paper is the explanation and presentation of simulations of revenue streams from the top-up ICL. This allows insight into what such an approach might mean both for government subsidies and for the financial benefits and costs for the families involved.

While the focus is on the use of an ICL in the context of PPL, it is critical to note what this paper is not about with respect to policy reform. Importantly we have not examined the extent to which theory and data inform us as to how the total costs of PPL should be borne by taxpayers, employers and individual families. There might be a case for contributions from all parties if all three benefit from PPL, but our focus is instead on how families might be able to finance their own optional extension component of assistance; thus we consider the use of an ICL for financing part of PPL as an addition to the provision of 18 weeks paid leave to be financed by taxpayers.

2. The Current Situation and the Case for Intervention

PPL is ‘an income replacement to compensate for the leave from paid employment necessary around childbirth’ (HREOC, 2002, p. 13) and is a contemporary public policy issue with both social and economic importance, of significance for both scholarly debate, and government, as evidenced by the announcement of the new policy.

The current state of affairs with PPL provisions in Australia is summarised in the PC’s report (PC, 2009, Chapter 3). Essentially there exists statutory unpaid parental leave provisions with families entitled to up to 52 weeks of unpaid leave. However, Australia did not legislate for a minimum PPL system across the workforce despite recommendations in 2002 by HREOC for a national, government-funded scheme of 14 weeks PPL (HREOC, 2002). It is often pointed out by proponents of approaches such as these that Australia is one of only two countries in the OECD (the United States being the other) in which there is currently no legislative requirement or taxpayer subsidies for PPL. However, individual workers in certain areas of employment may have access to PPL through collective bargaining, public sector employment benefits, or by working for an employer who provides PPL as a key part of their human resources strategy (Baird and Litwin, 2005). Although close to 50 per cent of employees had some form of PPL available in 2007 (PC, 2009, p. 3.1), deficiencies in the current system are apparent (see for example, Baird, Brennan, and Cutcher, 2002), with PPL being ‘…relatively concentrated among groups who usually have better labour force outcomes, such as highly paid workers, professionals and permanent full-time workers’ (PC, 2009, p. 3.28).

Advocates of PPL arrangements have argued that there are important benefits of a policy which encourages recent mothers not to resume paid employment soon after the birth of their child (see, for example, HREOC, 2002; O’Neill, 2004). Although the average duration of time away from paid work among those who take leave is 37 weeks (the majority of which is unpaid maternity leave), according to the PC, ‘Many parents return to work earlier than six months – often against their own preferences...’ (2009, p. xx). Indeed, only 72 per cent of employed mothers take leave around childbirth, with

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2 For a discussion of the possible involvement of employers, see Chapman (2002).
3 For example, see Baird (2004). Also see Baird and Whitehouse (2007) and others in a special issue in the Australian Bulletin of Labour on work and family policy issues for Australia.
4 Workplace.gov.au (2008). Employees taking parental leave have the right to return to their original position, to request other leave (such as annual leave), extend parental leave once during the 52 week period and vary or shorten the leave.
the vast majority of those who don’t take leave resigning from paid work (PC, 2009, p. 3.1). Research summarised in the PC report suggests that employer retention rates and women’s workforce attachment could be improved in the presence of a universal PPL scheme. Benefits of appropriately designed PPL may also include improved child and maternal health and welfare, and social benefits such as reduction of caring and working pressures on parents of young children and the financial independence associated with greater employment (see, PC, 2009, for a summary of these and other potential benefits).

It was intended by the PC that their recommendation of 18 weeks provide sufficient postnatal leave so it should ‘…when supplemented by people’s private efforts, achieve a length of absence from work for most families that provides significant maternal and child welfare benefits…’ At the same time they acknowledge that ‘…there is no exact science about choosing the precise duration…’ (PC, 2009, p. xxi), and there are important financial considerations. Notably, ‘The benefits to children and parents from incrementally longer periods of leave have to be weighed against their (appreciable) budgetary costs’ (PC, 2009, p. xxi). It seems that the government has agreed with these perspectives.

While a compelling argument for government subsidisation arises from a recognition that society benefits from a potentially larger and healthier workforce and from a presumed higher productivity and increased tax revenue when parents return to paid work, there are also immediate benefits to parents from a PPL scheme (for example, in the form of recovery from child birth, or long term positive emotional consequences for children). Given the benefits, the question arises as to whether or not there should be institutional arrangements to allow those interested to be able to at least partially finance their own parental leave if they do not have the private facilities to do so; if not, we have a market failure. This leaves the door open for government intervention of some form.

First, it is critical to understand the nature of the market failure in this setting. During periods of parental leave families experience a significant decline in household incomes and this, coupled with asymmetric information concerning future paid labour force intentions, restricts the availability of commercial credit. It is unlikely that banks would offer loans to poor prospective borrowers because of default risk and the absence of collateral. Even in the event that bank loans were available for the financing of paid maternity leave, they would have the following undesirable characteristics for the borrower: mortgage-type loans do not offer insurance to the borrower against default, and in this event there are thus significant issues for the borrower’s credit reputation; and, bank loans do not provide protection from the potential consumption hardship associated with repayment obligations that are insensitive to future capacity to pay.5

Without government intervention, parents wishing to take leave for child-rearing purposes face unpalatable alternatives: a period of considerably reduced incomes and consumption; and/or the prospect of accessing or extending a mortgage loan with undesirable properties. Government intervention in the use or part-use of an income contingent loan mechanism could help resolve the issue.

For most families interested in financing PPL, bank loans will not be available in the absence of collateral to provide insurance against default. Just as is the case with respect to the financing of higher education, an income contingent loan allows

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5 For extended discussion of the same set of issues associated with student financing, see Barr (2001) and Chapman (2006).
borrowers the opportunity to distribute income from future propitious periods of their economic lives to current periods of need. There is thus a fairly long life-cycle aspect to consumption-smoothing from an income contingent loan for PPL.

3. Designing an ICL

In this section we present the design parameters for an ICL for extensions beyond the government’s 18 week taxpayer funded PPL and explore, using a simple model at the individual family level, the likely implications for both recipients (families) and the provider (the government) of the scheme. The exploration of patterns of hypothetical repayments and costs requires two aspects of the modelling to be made explicit: the design parameters of a loan scheme, and the demographic and financial scenarios of loan recipients. To these ends, and for illustrative purposes, we propose policy parameters for the model of a basic scheme, and present scenarios of some common family types to show how such a scheme might work. For the modelling it has been assumed that the ICL assistance would begin immediately after the 18 week period of grants-based assistance.

An ICL for extending PPL needs to give important weight to the potential of both adverse selection and moral hazard to undermine such a scheme (Chapman, forthcoming 2009). Adverse selection could arise if those seeking relatively high amounts of support expect to repay relatively low proportions of the loan. This could happen, for example, if repayment obligations were defined to be the responsibility only of the person undertaking the leave, for example, the mother. If she believed it was unlikely that she would ever earn the first income threshold of repayment, or expected that it would take a long period of time to do so, there would be potential for relatively large taxpayer subsidies. In some extreme cases, the loan would effectively turn into a grant. The expected time period of repayment is critical in calculations of the extent of taxpayer contributions from a scheme. These subsidies can potentially be high, as seen in Chapman and Lounkaew (2008), who show that the interest rate subsidies associated with FEE-HELP are typically of the order of 25-30 per cent for high debts.

The circumstances associated with this form of adverse selection would include a debtor expecting: (i) not to work in the paid labour market again, or not for a long period of time; (ii) not to earn above the first threshold of repayment again, or not for a long time, perhaps because of the expectation of further children and/or undertaking only part-time work; or (iii) to emigrate or spend significant time overseas.

Similar implications for taxpayer subsidies arise from moral hazard. In this area moral hazard takes the form of PPL debtors changing their behaviour in order to avoid repaying the debt, or in order to repay it very slowly. This could arise by debtors deciding: (i) not to return to paid work, or to return only after a long period; (ii) to take part-time instead of full-time work; or (iii) to emigrate or spend significant time overseas.

The scheme is designed in such a way to take account for these potentially undermining factors.

Employer Participation

An ICL applied to an extended PPL could be structured broadly in two ways: one in which the parent(s) is (are) solely responsible for repayment; or one in which the parent(s) is (are) responsible for some repayment, but the employer, as a beneficiary of the scheme, also plays a role.
The chief area in which an employer could participate would be individually negotiated arrangements to repay some part of their employee’s outstanding loan, on condition that they return to their original workplace for a specified period. There are reasons in labour market theory for promoting such a possibility (see, Becker, 1962). In the Becker model of the financing of training, an important distinction is made between skill investments that are general (transferable between employers) and firm-specific (those that are of relevance only in the place in which the skills are acquired). In order to minimise the possibility of separation between the firm and the worker, and thus the loss of future returns to training investments specific to the firm, it is argued that the firm and the worker should jointly finance such investments.

The essential point is that in the event that the parent does not return to the original employer there are costs incurred which take the form of foregone returns to the firm’s specific training investments in the worker. There is a benefit to be gained through re-employment at the original place of work, which constitutes a case for loan repayment contributions from the employer. Chapman (2002) suggests that these contributions should be made conditional on the parent returning to their original job since in this situation the employer gains. One form this might take would be for the employer and the employee to share loan repayments for the period in which the employee remains with the firm, or until the debt is repaid.

In addition, as raised by Gans (2008), by increasing the probability of the parent returning to their original job, shared loan arrangements reduce the risk of discrimination against PPL recipients. Shared loan arrangements would also mean that the relative contribution to loan payments would be higher for parents choosing not to return to the original job. Significantly, and in addition, having employers contribute to loan repayments would increase the proportion of debt recovered by government and decrease the implicit subsidies.

The simplest arrangement, however, would see parents applying for a loan after an initial period of leave financed by taxpayers, with the loan provided by the government and to be repaid by the debtor and/or the family depending on the level of their future incomes. It is this simple government-provided optional loan scheme, excluding employer involvement, which is examined in detail and is the subject of modelling in the remainder of this paper.

**Loan Eligibility**

Conditions on eligibility are essential in order to discourage adverse selection. A poor example of how to design an ICL for an extension to PPL would be to encourage borrowing from prospective parents with weak attachment to the paid labour force, since this is likely to result in relatively low repayment of the debt. Eligibility to participate in the loan scheme should be restricted to parents in employment prior to the planned leave.

This is consistent with the new government scheme which limits eligibility to parents who have ‘…been employed continuously (with one or more employers) for at least 10 of the 13 months prior to the expected birth of the child, and who undertook at least 330 hours of paid work in the 10 month period’ (PC, 2009, p. 2.1).6 As the

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6 The government scheme also limits participation to primary carers who have earned less than $150,000 in the full financial year prior to the birth or adoption of a child (Budget Papers, 2009).
partner is also responsible for the debt under the ICL extension scheme proposed here, it could be argued that the risk of adverse selection is sufficiently reduced and thus the prior employment condition could be relaxed. However, although this may be true for couples it is not the case for singles, and although not making the loan facility available to non-working mothers may be seen as inequitable, the purpose of the proposed ICL is as a temporary income replacement while the parent is on leave from work, and not as a reward for unpaid care.\footnote{Additionally, costs, including doubtful debt, could be considerable if the ICL was offered to all parents.}

Eligibility conditions relating to past work patterns are not required for the scenarios generated here, but are critical in scheme design and for accurate projections of aggregate take-up and costs. Importantly, eligibility criteria based on previous employment is not neutral, but will affect choices prospective parents make regarding labour force participation. Both couples and single parents who satisfied the previous employment condition would be eligible for the ICL under the proposed scheme.

**Loan Duration and Amount**

Under the basic scheme a parent could take out a loan from the government to extend leave by 26 weeks (after expiry of the 18 week period paid for by taxpayers) for a first child (or twins). This means that a household accessing the full loan would have a total of 44 weeks leave (18 financed by the government). In addition in our modelling we allow a further 26 week extension for a subsequent birth.

There may, of course, be less demand for a repayable loan scheme with a 26 week duration. In this event a shorter ICL may be worth contemplating, and to ascertain what a shorter period would mean for the government and for families we also present calculations for a ten week loan period.

As with the new government scheme, we assume that the size of the loan per fortnight is the hourly federal minimum wage\footnote{As at October 2008 the Federal Minimum Wage stood at $543.78 per week ($14.31 per hour). (Australian Fair Pay Commission, 2008).} multiplied by 76 hours (38 hours per week), and with the 26-week cap this comes to $14,138. The maximum loan, capped for two children, is twice this amount at $28,277; however, for many of those eligible the leave taken and the debt incurred would be lower. In comparison, for ten weeks of loan financed leave, the amount for one child would be $5,438 or $10,876 for two children.

**Interactions with Existing Government Benefits**

There is a number of existing government benefit payments that parents of young children are able to access for the purpose of child rearing. These include the Family Tax Benefit A (FTB A), Family Tax Benefit B (FTB B), Parenting Payment (PP), and Baby Bonus (Centrelink, 2009). As the ICL for PPL is conceived as an optional loan, the policy should not affect eligibility for existing non-repayable government payments; to do so would potentially reduce the incentive to participate in the scheme.

As the purpose of intended intervention is to provide sufficient income to facilitate parental leave, it can be argued that determination of an appropriate ICL amount should take into account existing government income support. To clarify the potential role of ICL interaction with existing benefits, as an alternative to the fixed loan amounts stated above, we consider an ICL such that the loan plus FTB A, FTB B,
and PP, is equal to the federal minimum wage of $543.78 per week. An implication is that eligible single parents on low wages who are already in receipt of high government benefit payments would be able to borrow relatively less than higher-earning parents who may have access to only partial payments.

An implication of the above arrangement is that all eligible individuals, regardless of their marital and financial status, would be able to access an equal amount of government support, being equivalent to minimum wage. Indeed the support mechanisms in aggregate maintain progressivity; single low-income parents derive the majority of their income support during periods of parental leave through existing non-repayable benefits, supplemented with the ICL, whereas eligible higher income couples derive the majority of support through the ICL itself.

Alternative rules could be imposed where, for example, it is just the ICL plus PP that together add to minimum wage, and FTB A and B are excluded from determination of the loan amount. Recommendations emerging from the Henry taxation review which are due in late 2009 may lead to family welfare benefit changes. Thus, it is premature to attempt to model an optimal arrangement for how an ICL should interact with existing government benefits. Instead, we acknowledge the importance of establishing loan rules allowing for interactions with the welfare system, and illustrate this through the hypothetical scenarios that follow.

**Debt Indexation and Surcharge**

As with HECS, we assume the loans are indexed to the CPI. Although this implies a zero real interest rate, a surcharge of 20 per cent on the borrowed amounts is proposed so the outstanding debt, or amount to be repaid, is 20 per cent more in nominal terms than the amount borrowed (for example, if a person borrowed $100 they would have to repay $120.) This amount is chosen for consistency with the FEE-HELP loan scheme (DEST, 2007) which is available to assist students pay undergraduate tuition for those not covered by HECS-HELP. The 20 per cent surcharge is in effect a blunt form of real interest rate, and it is important to note that Chapman and Lounkaew (2008) show that this level of surcharge is roughly equivalent to a real rate of interest of three per cent per annum for the levels of debt considered in our simulations. Costs of the ICL scheme to parents and the government can vary substantially if the indexation rate or the surcharge are altered, and in practice, the choice of surcharge and/or debt indexation to be applied should be the subject of careful consideration and modelling.10

**Repayment Conditions**

Repayments are made when assessable income exceeds a specified minimum threshold. The choice of minimum threshold, and the decision who repays, are important considerations in policy design as both can be critical in mitigating the risk of adverse selection. In this context there are two major design features of the scheme.

First, the repayments of the ICL should be made the obligation of both parents

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9 Importantly, we assume that the ICL is not taxable, and doesn’t affect eligibility for benefits. We have assumed that receipt of the Baby Bonus is unaffected by the availability of the ICL.

10 As noted, in their final report the PC supported the use of ICLs for extending the duration of leave, but this was subject to application of a current mortgage interest rate rather than our suggestion of a 20 per cent surcharge with a zero real rate of interest (PC, 2009, page 8.20).
(provided they are a couple at the time of the loan contract). Importantly, this would reduce the risk that a mother takes out the loan with the intention of never returning to work or intentionally keeping their income below the minimum threshold. In this situation total repayments during each time period are the sum of the two repayment amounts, which are assessed based on each of the parent’s individual incomes. This is feasible logistically as the current tax collection mechanism in Australia allows for the collection of spouse details. Moreover, if both parents are treated individually by the Australian Taxation Office in the calculation of the compulsory repayment, this removes a possible complication in the event the parents separate. In this circumstance the outstanding balance would remain a liability of both parties irrespective of the status of their relationship.

A complication that could potentially arise is moral hazard manifesting from parents intentionally not declaring themselves as a couple in order to avoid the father’s liability. To guard against this risk, discounts on the loan or freezing of interest on the debt could be considered for those declaring two persons as liable on the loan document. Similarly, to further reduce taxpayer subsidies by increasing the chance of repayments, for single parents who wish to take advantage of discounts for multiple signatories, the loan rules could be expanded to allow other individuals (for example, a direct family member) to take liability by signing the loan document, though these considerations are not modelled here.

Second, to mitigate the possible costs due to non-retrieval of debt due to low future incomes a first income threshold of repayment that is lower than the first threshold applied to HECS is proposed. This is likely to be particularly appropriate for the small minority of mothers living separately from the father of their child at the time of the parental leave. In order to avoid hardships associated with repayment in this circumstance there would be a commensurate reduction in the proportion of income required (from the four per cent with HECS, to, say, two per cent).

To achieve the above we use the minimum income repayment threshold of $28,259, which is equivalent to the exempt income amount under the Australian Child Support System (CSS) for a parent with a dependent child under the age of 13 in 2008. This threshold is chosen for the current exercise as it is considered to be a suitable proxy for the lower limit of income affordability for individuals faced with child rearing responsibilities.

Thus for our exercises we use the 2008-09 HECS repayment rules adjusted by imposing the additional requirement taken from the CSS rules, resulting in the annual payment thresholds and rates shown in table 1.

11 This approach is adopted by Chapman, Freiberg, Quiggin and Tait (2004) with respect to the modelling of an income contingent fine payment system for low level criminal offences.

12 See http://www.csa.gov.au/guide/2_4_2.htm. This amount is higher than the exempt income level available for parents with no dependants due to the costs associated with raising a child.

13 Under the CSS the income used in the determination of support differs with the number of dependent children, but for the sake of simplicity this has been ignored here. The income threshold of $34,926 per annum was selected as an intermediate threshold between the new minimum threshold and the HECS minimum because it is approximately mid-way between these two levels. Determination of rules for calculating repayments in practice can be particularly complex and so will not be explored further here. An appreciation of the complexity in such schemes can be gleaned from examination of the rules for the CSS.

Table 1 - Repayment Thresholds and Rates for PPL Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repayment Threshold</th>
<th>Repayment Rate (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below $28,259</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$28,260-$34,926</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$34,927-$41,594</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$41,595-$46,333</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$46,334-$51,070</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$51,071-$53,754</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>$53,755-$57,782</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$57,783-$62,579</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$62,580-$65,873</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$65,874-$72,492</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>$72,493-$77,247</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$77,248 and above</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Parameters

Because the scheme involves repayments over time with differing indexation arrangements, some assumptions are required with respect to price and wage change: these are 2.5 per cent (the middle of the Reserve Bank of Australia’s acceptable band for price inflation) and 4 per cent per annum respectively, which are the approximate rates over the last few years in Australia (RBA, 2008a). Consistent with the HECS-HELP and FEE-HELP arrangements, we adjust the income thresholds for this assumed rate of growth in average weekly earnings. As is now the case with current ICLs, there is no liability for repayment of the debt from the debtor’s estate upon the death of the borrower. Further, in the modelling undertaken for this exercise a 52 week waiting period has been applied from the final loan payment before repayments are required.

Dealing with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Summary

As anticipated above, it is critical to recognise that PPL ICL scheme design has both adverse selection and moral hazard firmly in mind, and this is addressed in the following ways. First, eligibility is restricted to a parent or parents in employment prior to paid maternity leave. Second, both parents are responsible for the debt obligation provided both are present at the time of the leave. Third, a 20 per cent surcharge is imposed on the loan, which may deter participation from borrowers who are tempted to take out the loan due to the low debt indexation rates. Fourth, a low first income threshold below that applying to HECS is applied to the loan.

Despite these features the PC raised the possible disincentive to exceed the income threshold as a criticism of ICL applied to PPL, thus ‘...reducing their incentives to work at the margin...’ (2008, p. 8.14). In this context and so as to not burden debtors on low incomes, the first rate of repayment for a parent was intentionally set at the low level in which only two per cent of income ($539.06 per annum, or less than $11 per week for an income of $28,260) would be required to pay off the debt. Since the sums of money are so small, it seems unlikely to us that parents would intentionally reorganise their work circumstances in order to avoid such an obligation.15

15 Although not directly generalisable to PPL, empirical evidence against the risks posed by moral hazard in this context is given by Chapman and Leigh (2009), who show that for HECS, while there is a statistically significant amount of bunching below the first threshold, in empirical and economic terms the effect is trivial.
In Australia there is an additional issue of PPL borrowers potentially having an existing HECS debt. The prospect of a similar debt for PPL might encourage relatively high borrowings from former higher education students (a case of adverse selection) and/or disincentives to reach the first income threshold of repayment because the financial benefits of this type of avoidance are relatively high if the total income contingent loan debt is high (a case of moral hazard). Explorations of the extent of the above potential problem by Dr Peng Yu (private correspondence) using Wave Six (2006) of the HILDA survey reveal, however, that the issue is not very important empirically. The data imply that only around one-tenth of young mothers who would have been potentially eligible for an ICL for PPL also have a HECS debt. Nevertheless, the number and magnitude of HECS debts is rising, and multiple ICL debt obligations could conceivably become a financial strain should a new variant of the scheme be introduced. A simple way forward would be to group all such debts together, and have one on-going compulsory repayment based on income. This would have the effect of extending the duration of the loan(s), thus increasing the net subsidy, but not the amount of the annual repayment obligation.

**Scenarios - Constructing a Basic Model**

Four scenarios have been chosen to reflect family units which might be expected to utilise the ICL. The scenarios illustrate how the policy might work in practice by showing patterns of outstanding debt, repayments, and government subsidy (due to default protection and the zero real indexation on the outstanding debt). The four scenarios are summarised in table 2, and the results are provided in the section following.

**Table 2 - The Scenarios Under Analysis**

| 1 | Couple with two children |
|   | Mother’s employment: NW-PT-NW-PT-FT |
|   | (PT for 1 year between the two NW phases, PT for 2 years following birth of 2nd child before returning FT) |
|   | Father’s employment: FT |

| 2 | Couple with two children |
|   | Mother’s employment: NW-PT-NW-PT |
|   | (PT for 1 year between the two NW phases, PT following birth of 2nd child) |
|   | Father’s employment: FT |

| 3 | Single with one child |
|   | Mother’s employment: NW-PT-FT |
|   | (PT for two years before returning FT) |

| 4 | Single with one child |
|   | Mother’s employment: NW-PT |
|   | (PT continually after maternity leave) |

Key: FT = full-time paid work; NW = on maternity leave and not in paid work; PT = part-time paid work.

Scenarios 1 and 2 are two-parent households with two children, while scenarios 3 and 4 are single-parent households with one child. For the two couple scenarios the father is assumed to be working full-time, and the mother works full-time under scenario 1 after returning from leave with the second child, whereas she works part-time under scenario 2 and doesn’t return to full-time employment. We assume that the loan is taken out for the maximum of 26 weeks (or ten weeks for the additional example) following the birth of each child and the expiration of a period of grants-based assistance. Under scenarios 3 and 4 the mother is a single parent with one child, and for the former she takes PPL, after which she returns to part-time paid work for two years before full-time paid work, whereas under scenario 4 she remains in part-time paid work following expiration of the leave.
While the empirical exercises include single mothers, rather than single fathers, the vast majority of single parent families are headed by mothers\(^\text{16}\), and this allows us to keep the analysis straightforward, with extensions of ICL into more flexible parental leave arrangements being a desirable area for future analysis.

Justification for selecting these family compositions comes from ABS statistics (for example, Australian Social Trends (ABS, 2007b); 2006 Census (ABS, 2006b)). Among other things, the data reveal that 75 per cent of partnered fathers with dependent children work full-time, and close to 70 per cent of both single and partnered mothers engage in full-time or part-time paid work by the time their children have reached their teenage years\(^\text{17}\). These statistics would no doubt be greater if we only include parents who engaged in paid work prior to having children.

In all scenarios the father is assumed to be aged 33 and the mother aged 31 at the time of birth of the first child, ages consistent with the 2006 Australian median ages of 33.1 and 30.8 respectively (ABS, 2006a). We assume assessable income is below the minimum threshold once parents retire, and retirement is assumed to occur at ages 62 for men and 58 for women (ABS, 2007a).

**Income Assumptions**

As loan repayments are contingent on income, projected future debtor income is a critical assumption for the scenarios. Specifically, the measure of income that we assume for calculation of loan repayment obligations, known henceforth as assessable income, is equal to taxable income, plus any reduction in taxable income due to rental loss, plus fringe benefits and exempt foreign employment income. This is the same definition as applies under the HECS-HELP scheme\(^\text{18}\).

Assessable incomes were approximated by extracting relevant components of income from the ABS 2003-04 and 2005–06 surveys of Income and Housing Confidentialised Unit Record File (CURF) (ABS, 2004; ABS, 2006c). In addition to the specific components of income, age group, sex, employment status (full-time and part-time), and relationship status (single or partnered) were extracted for all individuals in the surveys. The data from both surveys were adjusted with AWOTE growth to the present (ABS, 2008) and average 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles (lower, median and upper quartiles) were calculated from the adjusted data across the two surveys.

As the CURF data is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, adjustments are made to the data for projection purposes. Projections of assessable income in subsequent years allow for increases due to gains in productivity, inflation and returns to experience or promotion\(^\text{19}\).

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\(^\text{16}\) According to ABS statistics, 87 per cent of single parent families with children under 15 years were headed by mothers in 2006 (ABS, 2007b).

\(^\text{17}\) That the majority of mothers either return to paid work part-time or full-time following leave to have children is supported by research from other sources including: Australian Institute of Family Studies (2007); Whitehouse, Baird, Diamond and Hosking (2006); and Social Policy Research Centre (2006).

\(^\text{18}\) See http://www.goingtouni.gov.au

\(^\text{19}\) For an individual aged \(g\) at time \(t\), the projected quartile of income for the same individual aged \(g+1\) at time \(t+1\) was approximated by taking the cross-sectional income quartile at age \(g+1\) and time \(t\), and inflating this by projected growth in average weekly earnings to time \(t+1\). This process creates an artificial cohort from the available cross-sectional data. This was repeated for future years and for median-, lower- and upper- income quartiles.
Subsidy Calculations

An ICL for PML does not strictly imply a user-pays scheme, since there is a cost to the government and taxpayer if debtors fail to reach the repayment thresholds and never repay the debt. There is also a potential cost to government even if the loan is repaid, due to the zero real interest rate. These subsidies can be expressed as the present value of the difference between how much is provided by the government and how much is repaid by the borrower, as a proportion of the amount provided, using an appropriate discount rate. If a borrower repays none of the debt, this is equivalent to a 100 per cent subsidy to the borrower. But because of the 20 per cent surcharge, the present value of repayments can exceed the amount outlaid, and consequently a negative subsidy can result. The scenarios examined in our exercises reveal the circumstances under which positive or negative subsidies can arise. For the scenarios explored herein, the discount rate chosen to calculate the present value of the repayments and new debt is (nominal) 5.5 per cent, being the approximate average 10 year government bond rate over the last five years (RBA, 2008b).

4. Results

Results for the four scenarios are now presented under the assumption of loan amounts based on a leave period of 26 weeks. Three income levels, low (25th percentile), medium (50th percentile), and high (75th percentile) are given for each scenario. For scenarios one and two, the parents are assumed to have two children and hence the amount borrowed ($28,277) is twice the single amount ($14,138).

Figure 1 illustrates the time stream of repayments of the debts, and figure 2 illustrates the time stream of outstanding debt. The following points are noteworthy from the two figures:

1. The repayments follow a step shape, which is a consequence of the increments to income being calculated annually.
2. The accumulation of debt early in the life of the loan takes a stepped appearance in scenarios one and two due to the loan amount increasing when leave is taken for the second child.
3. There are large differences in time to repayment in all scenarios depending on income, ranging from about five years to 17 years for two-parent families with two children.
4. For single mothers on median part-time incomes who never return to full-time work, considerable time is taken until total debt is repaid, and for single mothers who earn at the 25th percentile of part-time income, their income is below the lowest repayment threshold and as a consequence no debt is repaid at any stage.

20 These initial results ignore interactions with existing government benefits.
21 For the couple scenarios, 1 and 2, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile cases mean that both male and female income profiles are the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile levels respectively.
Figure 1 - Time Stream of Repayments for 26 Week Loan

Figure 2 - Time Stream of Outstanding Debt for 26 Week Loan
Table 3 presents the subsidy proportions for each income band within each scenario, along with the present value of both the amount outlaid by the government and the amount repaid by the borrower, both for loans based on leave duration of 26 weeks and ten weeks. The subsidies are determined by the interest rate differential (being the difference between the indexation rate of CPI applied to the loan and the discount rate of 5.5 per cent per annum), the 20 per cent surcharge, and the unique future income circumstances of the specific borrowers (which affects the time until repayment of the loan).

Table 3 - Government Subsidies for Different Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Income Percentile</th>
<th>Present Value of the Amount Outlaid ($)</th>
<th>Present Value of the Repayments ($)</th>
<th>Subsidy Proportion (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 week loan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26,286</td>
<td>26,159</td>
<td>28,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26,286</td>
<td>24,707</td>
<td>27,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13,765</td>
<td>12,742</td>
<td>13,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13,765</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 week loan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,274</td>
<td>11,229</td>
<td>11,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10,274</td>
<td>11,076</td>
<td>11,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,338</td>
<td>5,558</td>
<td>5,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,338</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of note in Table 3 is the sensitivity of results to the amount of debt accrued. Reducing the amount of leave from 26 to ten weeks, and thereby the amount of debt accrued, significantly reduces the subsidy in all cases with the exception of the lowest income quartile for scenario 4 where the mother’s income is such that no debt is repaid.

Table 3 illustrates that repaying the loan quickly provides negative taxpayer subsidies (as the benefits to the government from the loan surcharge more than offset the opportunity cost of the low loan indexation rate), and those repaying slowly or incompletely will generate positive – and in some cases, potentially large – subsidies (as the costs of low loan indexation rates outweigh the benefits to the government of the surcharge.)

It is apparent from examination of the scenarios that the highest positive subsidies are received by those families most in financial need over their lifetimes. Single mothers, particularly those on low incomes, take the longest time to repay or don’t repay the loan, and consequently benefit most from the low loan indexation. This feature of distributing most benefit to those with greater financial need is common to ICL with interest rate arrangements that have been adopted for HECS-HELP and FEE-HELP. It is clear also that the income contingent nature of the loan provides for default protection, as highlighted for single mothers earning low part-time incomes.

Median- and high-income earners, namely those at the 50th and 75th income percentile under scenarios 1, 2 and 3, experience negative subsidies due to the role of the surcharge. The subsidies in Table 3 indicate the net position for the government, and do not reflect whether or not a parent, who may have a different, and higher, cost of capital, would benefit financially from participation. One way of exploring this issue is to find the discount rate that would set the subsidy to zero per cent for each income percentile.
quartile within each scenario. These are presented in table 4 for the 26 week loan. If a parent could borrow funds privately below these equivalent discount rates, then their costs of servicing the private loan would be less than the costs they would otherwise face through an ICL. For example, for a single parent on the lowest quartile of full-time income, they would have to borrow at a rate below 4.6 per cent per annum for the repayments to be less onerous than those available through the ICL. This comparison between an ICL and private loans is not as simple as it appears however, as the default protection implicit in the contingent nature of the ICL is an added attraction that is not replicated in the credit markets.

Table 4 - Equivalent Discount Rates Corresponding to Zero Per Cent Subsidy for 26 Week Loan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Percentile/Scenario</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>75%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although negative subsidies do not imply that the loan may be financially unattractive to parents, there will remain circumstances of non-participation from some parents with the financial means to provide for their own leave. Although one may see this as an equitable outcome as the policy then targets those groups most in need, choices made along these lines have an adverse selection dimension as well, since if those who avoid participation would have otherwise generated a negative subsidy, this has the effect of increasing the overall taxpayer subsidy from the policy.

As described earlier, a possible alternative to fixed ICL amounts is to vary the loan amount based on the receipt of existing parental government income support payments, and we now illustrate what these interactions might mean for variations in the ICL amounts that would be made available. Assuming 26 weeks of parental leave (over the 18 weeks provided through a statutory scheme), table 5 gives the maximum possible ICL received for each scenario such that the ICL plus FTB A, FTB B, and Parenting Payment, is equal to minimum wage. Additionally, table 5 shows the value of the existing non-repayable government benefits provided during the period when the ICL is available (NB: the sum of the ICL and existing benefits is equal to minimum wage in each case), and the resulting government subsidies.

Rules for determination of amounts payable for FTB A, B and Parenting Payment were obtained from the Centrelink website: www.centrelink.gov.au. Additional assumptions follow. The mother receives 18 weeks of PPL via the government scheme, the ICL for 26 weeks thereafter, and part-time income (at 25th, 50th or 75th PT income percentiles) for the remaining 8 weeks of the year in which parental leave is taken. As announced in the 2009-10 budget, the statutory 18 week PPL scheme payments are taxable and count as assessable income when determining eligibility for FTB A and B, however, the payments do not affect entitlements to Parenting Payments. For scenarios 1 and 2 the father is assumed to work full-time during the year in which leave occurs. For scenarios 1 and 2 the amount of FTB A will differ for the second year of parental leave due to the additional child. However, the differences have relatively little impact on subsidies for couples and for simplicity it is assumed that the government benefit provided for the second child is identical to that available for the first. Household assets are assumed to be below the assets test limit for Parenting Payment eligibility. While quarantining rules apply to FTB B in practice (e.g., see PC, 2008, appendix F), implying that some parents taking non-paid parental leave who would otherwise not be eligible for FTB B due to high income may be eligible for the maximum rate, this feature has not been incorporated into the modelling herein.
The differences in loan amount and government benefit for the singles and couples are notable. Single parents in scenarios 3 and 4 are eligible for the maximum FTB benefit A and B during the year in which they take parental leave. All single parents considered are also eligible for Parenting Payment, with most being at the maximum rate. In contrast, mothers in scenario 1 and 2 are not eligible for any Parenting Payment, and are eligible for only partial or nil FTB A and B as a consequence of the inclusion of the father’s income.

For the subsidy calculations in table 5 it is assumed that the loan is received for 13 fortnights for each child. This implies a total loan amount (excluding the 20 per cent surcharge) of approximately $12,100, $12,200 and $13,300 per child for the three income percentiles in scenarios 1 and 2, and $2,600, $2,600, and $2,700 for scenarios 3 and 4. The subsidy proportions assume that the 20 per cent surcharge has been applied to the loans. As expected, since the government benefits provided are relatively low under the first two scenarios, the reduction in subsidies relative to the 26 week loan results from table 3 are modest. In contrast, for scenarios 3 and 4 the reduction in subsidy is greater due to considerably shorter repayment periods. The exception remains the lowest part-time earners who fail to reach the minimum income threshold.

Table 5 - Loan Amounts and Government Subsidies Allowing for Interactions with Existing Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Government Benefits (FTB A, FTB B and Parenting Payment) ($) (fortnightly)</th>
<th>ICL Amounts (per child) ($) (fortnightly)</th>
<th>Subsidy Proportion (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income Percentile</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What are the implications for aggregate costings? It is apparent from the results in table 3 that, assuming the loan amount is fixed and not conditional on existing government benefits, a large taxpayer cost could arise from single parents on low incomes. Although an ICL scheme’s viability would be questionable if this demographic was the primary group in the population, nationally lone parents make up fewer than 15 per cent of families with young dependants.23 In fact, only a proportion of these parents would contribute solely to the costs of their loan, since in some cases both parents would have existed as a couple (ABS, 2007b) at the time the loan was agreed. In these circumstances the father would be expected to contribute following divorce or separation under the scheme design parameters introduced here.

Even given substantial adverse selection, manifested by the dominance of single parent families in the scheme, a simple simulation shows that aggregate costs would be small. We assume that 50 per cent of take-up is by single parents, compared with an actual population proportion of 15 per cent corresponding to single parents.

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23 This statistic was obtained from the ABS 2005-06 Income and Housing Confidential Unit Record File based on families with dependants aged zero to two (ABS, 2006c).
and that of the single parents, 50 per cent of those participating are in the lowest income quartile. The aggregate government subsidy under these quite extreme circumstances is just 12 per cent assuming 26 weeks of leave, or just four per cent when based on ten weeks of leave. Assuming a take-up of the ICL by 37,500 families, with 50 per cent being single parent families, the aggregate subsidy for 26 weeks of leave comes to $65 million, or only $9 million for 10 weeks of leave. Under assumptions of no adverse selection, the aggregate subsidy based on values from table 3 would be close to zero per cent for 26 weeks of leave (implying a zero dollar net outlay), or minus ten per cent for ten weeks of leave. These calculations suggest that, even in conditions of pervasive adverse selection, the policy would not be costly.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

An income contingent loan for extending the government’s 18 week maternity leave grant to begin in 2011 can introduce flexibility and choice as an optional supplement. In terms of economic theory, government intervention of this type can be justified due to the presence of social spillovers from PPL that are not being delivered due to a market failure. Loans from commercial institutions for parental leave purposes in the circumstances of no saleable collateral and associated high risks of default would not be available.

An ICL in this context, as for similar ICL applications, delivers to borrowers consumption smoothing. By only requiring repayments when the family is in a suitable financial position, the policy effectively allows parents to transfer income from future propitious times to a preceding period when household incomes are lower as a result of a parent’s non-participation in paid work.

As illustrated in the empirical exercises, the scheme is progressive within the group of borrowers considered. Debtors with low future incomes and, in particular, single mothers, would repay the loan relatively slowly, meaning higher taxpayer subsidies, whereas those with higher incomes repay more quickly. The exercises suggest that the extent of the implicit rate subsidy may be as high as 100 per cent for single mothers with very low lifetime incomes, but this would be a very rare circumstance. For single mothers working full-time but in the lowest 25th income percentile, the extent of the subsidy is around seven per cent. For the majority of

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24 We assume that 25 per cent have the median income and 25 per cent have the upper quartile of income. Further we assume that 50 per cent of single families are full-time and 50 per cent are part-time.

25 125,000 is the potential take-up of the proposed statutory scheme for mothers estimated by the PC based on the PC statutory scheme eligibility conditions (PC, 2009). As the eligibility conditions for the statutory scheme match those proposed here for the ICL, we have assumed the same potential take-up. Of the 125,000 eligible families, it is assumed that 15 per cent are single parent families, the same as in the population as a whole for those with very young children, hence the maximum take-up possible by single parent families would be 18,750. For illustration of the possible empirical implications of adverse selection one method would be to assume that single parent families are 50 per cent of the total take-up, and that 100 per cent of single young mothers take up the loan option. This implies a maximum total take-up of the loan of 37,500. In practice, as the ICL is an optional loan rather than a grant, the take-up would be expected to be smaller. To put the dollar amounts of subsidy in context, the annual outlay for FTB A and B for this same group of 37,500 parents during the first year of parental leave is estimated at approximately $200 million, with over an additional $250 million for Parenting Payment. The subsidy amounts are considerably smaller if the ICL amounts are conditional on existing government benefits (as in table 5); following the same assumptions as above for illustration of extreme adverse selection, the aggregate subsidy would be very close to zero assuming 26 weeks of leave.
potential PPL borrowers, however, the subsidies are very small and even negative in cases of families receiving full-time median incomes. As suggested, an ICL would be financially attractive, despite negative government subsidies, to parents who may either have no alternative means to extend PPL or who face costly alternatives.

Take-up rates would be likely to be higher for members of groups who expect to be relatively poor, for two reasons. First, these mothers are more likely to be unable to finance a period of extended leave by other means. Second, those expecting to have relatively low incomes in the future are more likely to be interested in taking the loan because of higher expected interest rate subsidies. This possibility, while implying additional potential progressivity of the scheme, is of course not necessarily an advantage. Adverse selection of this type imposes higher costs in terms of taxpayer subsidies. As shown in section 3, the scheme has been designed with focussed consideration of adverse selection and moral hazard. While the innovations suggested would diminish the likelihood of the scheme resulting in substantial taxpayer subsidies, the prospect remains. However, even under significant adverse selection, some rough estimates suggest that aggregate taxpayer costs (excluding administrative expenses) would be low if not negligible.

References
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007a), Year Book Australia, ABS Cat. No. 1301.0, Commonwealth of Australia.


